

148 N.H. 143  
Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Representative Peter BURLING and another

v.

Gene CHANDLER, Speaker  
of the House and another.

No. 2002-0210.

|

Argued June 11, 2002.

|

Decided July 26, 2002.

Synopsis

Incumbents in state legislature filed petition for original jurisdiction requesting the Supreme Court to declare existing representative districts unconstitutional and to impose deadline for legislature to enact valid reapportionment plan for the house. The Supreme Court rejected parties' proposed plans and adopted court-designed plan.

Reapportionment plan adopted.

West Headnotes (23)

[1] **Constitutional Law** 🔑 Redistricting and reapportionment in general

**Election Law** 🔑 Judicial Review or Intervention

It is not the court's function to decide the peculiarly political questions involved in reapportionment, but it is the court's duty to insure the electorate equal protection of the laws.

📄 Const. Pt. 2, Arts. 9, 📄 11.

[2] **States** 🔑 Judicial review and control

When the legislature has failed to act, it is the judiciary's duty to devise a constitutionally valid reapportionment plan.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3] **States** 🔑 Judicial review and control

Given the imperative to establish state legislative redistricting plan consistent with constitutional requisites before the next elections, Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over incumbents' petition for original jurisdiction requesting court to declare existing representative districts unconstitutional and to impose deadline for legislature to enact valid reapportionment plan for the house.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[4] **Constitutional Law** 🔑 Constitution as supreme, paramount, or highest law

The state constitution is the supreme law of the state.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[5] **Constitutional Law** 🔑 Relation to Constitutions of Other Jurisdictions

The oath the Supreme Court justices took to honor the state constitution makes it the justices' duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the United States Constitution.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[6] **Constitutional Law** 🔑 Voting rights and suffrage in general

Provisions of the state constitution are at least as protective of a citizen's right to vote as the federal constitutional standard of one person/one vote. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 📄 Const. Pt. 2, Arts. 9, 📄 11.

[7] **States** 🔑 Population as basis and deviation therefrom

Overriding objective of apportionment must be substantial equality of population among the various legislative districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the state.

- [8] **States** 🔑 Population as basis and deviation therefrom

Although absolute population equality need not be achieved, a court devising a remedial apportionment plan for a state legislature must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

- [9] **States** 🔑 Population as basis and deviation therefrom

Any deviation from approximate population equality in a court-ordered remedial apportionment plan must be supported by enunciation of historically significant state policy or unique features.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

- [10] **States** 🔑 Judicial review and control

In devising a court-ordered remedial apportionment plan, court must act circumspectly, and in a manner free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.

- [11] **States** 🔑 Political subdivisions; multi-member or floterial districts

Single-member districts are preferred in achieving “substantial equality” in an apportionment plan, but use of multi-member districts is constitutionally permissible, unless the districts are designed to or would minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population, or their use produces deviations from substantial equality beyond the range of constitutional tolerance. 📄 Const. Pt. 2, Arts. 9, 📄 11.

- [12] **States** 🔑 Political subdivisions; multi-member or floterial districts

In devising a court-ordered remedial apportionment plan, court considers the state's traditional redistricting policy of

maintaining county boundaries; preserving county boundaries has been important historically because the state representatives of the districts of each county comprise the county convention, which has the power to raise county taxes, make appropriations, and authorize the purchase or sale of county real estate.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

- [13] **States** 🔑 Political subdivisions; multi-member or floterial districts

In devising a court-ordered remedial apportionment plan, a consideration is that representative districts have traditionally been comprised of contiguous territories; a state may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme.

- [14] **States** 🔑 Population as basis and deviation therefrom

The established method to determine whether a reapportionment plan affords citizens an equal right to vote is to calculate the extent to which the plan deviates from the ideal district population; the first step is to determine the ideal population, and then relative deviation is the most commonly used measure to determine the extent to which a given district population deviates from the ideal, by dividing the difference between the district's population and the ideal population by the ideal population. 📄 Const. Pt. 2, Arts. 9, 📄 11.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

- [15] **States** 🔑 Population as basis and deviation therefrom

To calculate the ideal population of a single-member district in determining whether a state legislative redistricting plan affords citizens an equal right to vote, the state population is divided by the total number of state representatives, while the ideal population for a multi-member district is expressed as a multiple of the

ideal population for a single-member district.

 Const. Pt. 2, Arts. 9,  11.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

- [16] **States**  Population as basis and deviation therefrom

Discrepancies between the ward populations as reported by various cities and as reported in federal census data required court to reject parties' state legislative redistricting plans.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

- [17] **States**  Judicial review and control

While political considerations are tolerated in legislatively-implemented redistricting plans, they have no place in a court-ordered plan.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

- [18] **States**  Judicial review and control

None of the submitted state legislative redistricting plans could be adopted by the Supreme Court, where each plan relied on incorrect population data, each plan miscalculated the overall range of population deviation, each plan had calculated partisan political consequences, and court had no principled way to choose among the plans.

- [19] **States**  Political subdivisions; multi-member or floterial districts

Court-adopted state legislative redistricting plan had 88 representative districts, none of which was a floterial, 65% of which had four or fewer representatives, and all of which were comprised of contiguous territories, and no town, ward, or place was divided unless it had requested division by referendum, county boundaries were not crossed in creating districts, plan had a range of deviation of 9.26%, and in devising the plan the court did not consider the impact on either political parties or incumbency.  Const. Pt. 2, Arts. 9,  11, 11-a.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

- [20] **States**  Population as basis and deviation therefrom

Deviation range of approximately 9% in a court-ordered reapportionment plan achieved "substantial equality."

- [21] **States**  Population as basis and deviation therefrom

Deviations in house legislative redistricting plan in the range of 49.7% were too high to be justified by any state interest.

- [22] **States**  Political subdivisions; multi-member or floterial districts

Floterials, which are districts that "float above" several distinct districts, are rejected as an unsound redistricting device.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

- [23] **Election Law**  Method of apportionment

An actual census taken by an individual city is not a general census taken by the authority of the United States or of the state, as required by the state Constitution, and may not be used as a basis for apportionment.  Const. Pt. 2, Art. 9.

### Attorneys and Law Firms

**\*\*474 \*144** Hatem & Donovan, P.C., of Salem (Michael D. Hatem and Bonnie J. Boulanger on the memorandum, and Mr. Hatem orally), for the petitioners.

Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, LLP, of Concord (Michael J. Connolly and Christopher H.M. Carter, on the memorandum, and Mr. Carter orally) for the Speaker of the New Hampshire House of Representatives.

Betsy B. Miller, house legal counsel, by memorandum and orally, for the New Hampshire House of Representatives.

John M. Pratt, by memorandum, and Mr. Pratt orally, pro se, as amici curiae.

Barry J. Glennon, staff attorney, of Concord, filed no memorandum, for the Secretary of State.

## Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Daniel Webster once said, “[T]he right to choose a representative is every man's portion of sovereign power.”

 *Luther v. Borden*, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 30, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849) (statement of counsel).

For the first time in the history of this State, the supreme court is required to scrutinize the process of apportioning the people's right to vote in the election of representatives. That scrutiny has revealed significant anomalies, perpetuated for many years in the legislative redistricting process, which have undermined the principles of equality upon which the New Hampshire House of Representatives was founded.

See  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9. Rather than protecting the people's constitutional right to “one person/one vote,” a system has evolved that falls far short of that ideal. We hold, therefore, that the current method of creating districts fails to insure that “every voter is equal to every other voter” in this State.  *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368, 380, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963).

[1] [2] This court has been drawn reluctantly into what is primarily a legislative task. “It is not our function to decide the peculiarly political questions involved in reapportionment, but it is our duty to insure the electorate equal protection of the laws.” *Silver v. Brown*, 63 Cal.2d 270, 46 Cal.Rptr. 308, 405 P.2d 132, 140 (1965). Therefore, when the legislature has failed to act, it is the judiciary's duty to devise a constitutionally valid reapportionment plan. See  *Scott v. Germano*, 381 U.S. 407, 409, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 14 L.Ed.2d 477 (1965) (*per curiam*).

In furtherance of that duty, we establish a plan for new house districts. Accordingly,  RSA 662:5 (1996) is no longer applicable. This plan corrects \*145 the constitutional deficiencies in the existing districts and eliminates the present inequities. We are primarily governed by the constitutional requirement of “one person/one vote.” In addition, in this

case, we are able to adhere to other New Hampshire constitutional requirements and traditional State redistricting policies. We are indifferent to political considerations, such as incumbency or party affiliation. The plan we establish restores as nearly equal weight as possible to the votes of the people of New Hampshire. We do this by eliminating floterials and creating as many single-member districts as possible, with as few multi-member districts as necessary.

### *I. Background and Procedural History*

The New Hampshire Constitution requires the legislature to redraw each representative district “as equal as circumstances \*\*475 will admit” every ten years, based upon the decennial census.  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9; see  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 11. In anticipation of the results of the 2000 census, the house began the reapportionment process in January 2001 with the introduction of House Bill (HB) 420.

According to the 2000 census, between 1990 and 2000, New Hampshire's population grew more than 10%, increasing from 1,109,252 citizens in 1990 to 1,235,786 citizens in 2000. This growth was unevenly distributed between the northern and southern portions of the State, however, with the largest population growth occurring in the south. As a result, it is undisputed that following the 2000 census, the existing representative districts, established in 1992 pursuant to the 1990 census, violate both the State and Federal Constitutions.

See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 11;  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;  RSA 662:5.

In the winter of 2002, after a series of public hearings on proposed reapportionment plans, HB 420, containing a new apportionment plan for the house was passed by both the house and the senate along party lines. The Governor vetoed the bill, however, on April 3, 2002. The house considered the Governor's veto on May 22, 2002, but was unable to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary to override it. As a result, HB 420 did not become law. See N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 44.

[3] In April 2002, the eleven petitioners, all incumbents, filed a petition for original jurisdiction requesting the court to declare the existing representative districts unconstitutional and to impose a deadline for the legislature to enact a valid reapportionment plan for the house. Given the imperative to establish a redistricting plan consistent with constitutional requisites before the 2002 elections, the court accepted

jurisdiction. See *Monier v. Gallen*, 122 N.H. 474, 476, 446 A.2d 454 (1982).

\*146 Because the senate and house recessed on May 22, 2002, without enacting a house reapportionment plan, the court determined that it must establish a constitutional reapportionment plan for the house before a 2002 election could be held. See *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 585, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 415, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977).

The court has endeavored to reapportion the house as fairly, as efficiently and as quickly as possible. It ordered the parties to submit constitutional reapportionment proposals by June 6, 2002. The court further required that any proposal submitted be based upon the 2000 census data and comply with the constitutional principle of one person/one vote. Oral argument was held on June 11, 2002. It was not until July 16, 2002, that the parties finally provided the court with all necessary information. This decision follows ten days later.

The court informed the parties of its intent to appoint Bobby Bowers, Director of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board Office of Research and Statistics, as its technical advisor in this case because it is an “extraordinary [one] where the introduction of outside skills and expertise, not possessed by the judge, will hasten the just adjudication of a dispute without dislodging the delicate balance of the juristic role.”

*Reilly v. United States*, 863 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir.1988). Without objection, the court appointed him pursuant to its inherent authority. See *id.* See generally *State v. Coon*, 974 P.2d 386, 395–96 (Alaska 1999) (discussing authority of courts to appoint expert technical advisors). Bowers was appointed to serve the same role in this case as he was appointed to serve in \*\*476 *Below v. Gardner*, 148 N.H. 1, 2002 WL 1369821 (decided June 24, 2002).

We have reviewed, in detail, each plan filed in accordance with court deadlines and have also considered the written and oral submissions of the parties.

## II. Governing Principles

[4] [5] The New Hampshire Constitution is the supreme law of this State. See *Merrill v. Sherburne*, 1 N.H. 199, 217, 1818 WL 479 (1818). The oath we took to honor that constitution makes it our duty to apply the State Constitution

when it does not conflict with the United States Constitution. See *State v. LaFrance*, 124 N.H. 171, 177, 471 A.2d 340 (1983).

### A. One Person/One Vote

#### 1. History of Part II, Articles 9 and 11

[3] We begin with a discussion of the one person/one vote standard under our own constitution. The New Hampshire Constitution guarantees that each citizen's vote will have equal N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 11. \*147 With respect to the house of representatives, this right is assured by Part II, Articles 9 and 11 of the State Constitution.

Part II, Article 9, as amended in 1964, requires that the house of representatives be “founded on principles of equality” and that representation in the house of representatives “be as equal as circumstances will admit.”

N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9. Part II, Article 11, as amended in 1964, states, in pertinent part:

When any town, ward, or unincorporated place, according to the last federal decennial census, has less than the number of inhabitants necessary to entitle it to one representative, the legislature shall form those towns, wards, or unincorporated places into representative districts which contain a sufficient number of inhabitants to entitle each district so formed to one or more representatives for the entire district. In forming the districts, the boundaries of towns, wards and unincorporated places shall be preserved and the towns, wards and unincorporated places forming one district shall be reasonably proximate to one another.

N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 11.

Both articles were last amended as a result of the Constitutional Convention in 1964. *See Journal of Constitutional Convention* 334, 358 (1964). Before 1964, Part II, Article 9 required the legislature to reapportion the house of representatives every ten years, following the taking of the national census. *See Levitt v. Stark*, 233 F.Supp. 566, 567 (D.N.H.1964). It further provided:

The number of inhabitants necessary to entitle any town or ward to representatives additional to the first shall be for each additional representative twice the number of inhabitants required for the first representative, so that the mean increasing number for every additional representative shall be twice the number required for the first or one representative.

*Id.* (quotation omitted).

Before 1964, Part II, Article 11 required the legislature to provide representation for towns or wards having fewer than the number of inhabitants to entitle them to a representative “in at least one session in every ten years.” *Id.* at 567–68 (quotation omitted). These towns or wards elected a representative “such proportionate part of the time as the number of its inhabitants shall bear to the requisite number established for one representative.” *Id.* at 568 (quotation omitted).

\*148 In 1961, the legislature set the number of inhabitants entitling a town to one representative at 822. *Id.*; *see* Laws 1961, ch. \*\*477 275. It also established the election years in the decade to follow in which towns having fewer than 822 people were to elect a representative. *Levitt*, 233 F.Supp. at 568; *see* Laws 1961, ch. 275. Under the 1961 law, the smallest of these towns elected a representative to only one out of the five legislatures to be called in the decade, and the largest of these towns elected a representative to four out of the five legislatures to be called in the decade. *Levitt*, 233 F.Supp. at 568. Inhabitants of unincorporated places had no representation. *Id.* Thus, before 1964, representation in the

house was essentially based upon a principle of one *town*/one vote, not one *person*/one vote.

At the 1964 Constitutional Convention, resolutions were introduced to amend both Part II, Article 9 and Part II, Article 11 to comply with recent United States Supreme Court decisions. The Governor supported amending Part II, Article 9 because he was “convinced that our present requirement that a town or ward have twice as much population for each additional representative as it needs for the first, would be declared unconstitutional.” *Journal of Constitutional Convention, supra* at 48. He urged delegates to amend Part II, Article 11 so as to “provide a system of full-time representation in the House of every citizen in New Hampshire” and, thus, “forestall action by the courts.” *Id.* The Governor warned that if the convention failed to amend these articles, “precedents in other states show that the courts will take action in your place.” *Id.*

Approximately one week after the convention began, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire issued its opinion in *Levitt*. In *Levitt*, the federal court stated that it “entertain[ed] serious doubt of the federal constitutional validity of the New Hampshire method for selecting the members of the legislature.” *Levitt*, 233 F.Supp. at 569. The court noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court had not yet held that *both* houses of a bicameral state legislature had to be apportioned on the basis of population, and intimated that if only one of the houses of the New Hampshire Legislature were apportioned on the basis of population, the other house might survive federal court scrutiny. *Id.*

Before adjourning on June 10, 1964, the convention successfully passed a resolution to amend Part II, Article 11. The resolution to amend Part II, Article 11 “was intended to grant to the General Court the power to create districts where there are towns, wards and unincorporated places which are too small to be entitled to one full-time representative.” *Journal of Constitutional Convention, supra* at 231. As one delegate noted, “At the present time, such towns, wards and places send representatives on a part-time basis only” and the delegates “have been warned in [*Lewitt*] that \*149 this provision for part-time representation is probably unconstitutional.” *Id.*

The amendment was also intended to give the legislature “a large measure of flexibility in forming districts.” *Id.* Thus, the legislature was not confined to drawing single-member districts, but was authorized to form districts that were represented by “one or more representatives.” *Id.*; see *Opinion of the Justices*, 111 N.H. 146, 150–51, 276 A.2d 825 (1971). Nor was the legislature required to form these multi-member districts only from the towns, wards and places that formerly had only part-time representation. The reference to “those towns, wards or unincorporated places” was not intended to limit the legislature’s discretion as to how to form multi-member districts. *Journal of Constitutional Convention, supra* at 231. As one delegate observed, “[W]e cannot here draw \*\*478 up a districting. That is a matter which will have to be taken up with the Legislature.” *Id.* at 220.

The requirement that the towns, wards and places within a district be “reasonably proximate” to one another was also intended to give the legislature flexibility in drawing house districts. The convention delegates “felt that the Legislature should join towns and places which are close together wherever possible, but that there might be some instances where it would be just that two or more towns in the same county be put into a district though not adjacent or very close to each other.” *Id.* at 231. The amendment the delegates passed, however, did not require the legislature to maintain county boundaries. *Id.*

The convention was unable to pass a resolution to amend Part II, Article 9 before adjourning on June 10, 1964. See *id.* at 399–402 (history of resolution nos. 4, 19 and 29); *Levitt v. Maynard*, 105 N.H. 447, 450–51, 202 A.2d 478 (1964). The convention reconvened on July 8, 1964, however, following the United States Supreme Court decision in *Reynolds*. In *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 576, 84 S.Ct. 1362, the Court held, for the first time, that the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution requires both houses of a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned on the basis of population. See *Levitt*, 105 N.H. at 450–51, 202 A.2d 478. When it reconvened, the convention resolved to amend Part II, Article 9 to state that the house of representatives was “founded on principles of equality” and to require that representation in the house be “as equal as circumstances will admit.” *Journal of Constitutional Convention, supra* at 351 53, 355, 358; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9.

[6] In light of the history of the 1964 amendments to Part II, Articles 9 and 11, we hold that these provisions are at least as protective of a citizen’s right to vote as the federal constitutional standard of one person/one vote. Accordingly, we need not undertake a separate federal analysis and we base this decision upon our State Constitution. See \*150 *State v. Ball*, 124 N.H. 226, 233, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). We rely upon federal cases interpreting the Federal Constitution only to aid in our analysis. See *id.*

## 2. Substantive Requirement of One Person/One Vote

[7] [8] [9] [10] “[T]he overriding objective [of apportionment] must be substantial equality of population among the various [legislative] districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.” *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362. Although “absolute population equality” need not be achieved, *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 732–33, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983), a court devising a remedial apportionment plan for a state legislature “must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation.” *Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. 1, 26–27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975). “[A]ny deviation from approximate population equality must be supported by enunciation of historically significant state policy or unique features.” *Id.* at 26, 95 S.Ct. 751. In devising a court-ordered remedial apportionment plan, we must also act “circumspectly, and in a manner free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.” *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 415, 97 S.Ct. 1828 (quotation omitted).

### a. Single- and Multi-Member Districts

[11] To achieve “substantial equality” in an apportionment plan, States generally use two types of districts: single-member districts consisting of one representative elected by the district’s voters, and multi- \*\*479 member districts from which more than one representative are elected. See *Burns v. Richardson*, 384 U.S. 73, 88, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966); see also G. Moncrief & R. Joula, *When the Courts Don't Compute: Mathematics and Floterial Districts*

in *Legislative Reapportionment Cases*, 4 J.L. & Pol. 737, 741 (1988).

Single-member districts are preferred. See  *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 415, 97 S.Ct. 1828;  *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 19, 95 S.Ct. 751. Use of multi-member districts is constitutionally permissible, however, unless the districts are designed to or would “minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population,”  *Fortson v. Dorsey*, 379 U.S. 433, 439, 85 S.Ct. 498, 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965); see *Opinion of the Justices*, 111 N.H. at 150–51, 276 A.2d 825, or their use “produces deviations from substantial equality beyond the range of constitutional tolerance,” *Opinion of the Justices*, 307 A.2d 198, 209 (Me.1973) (quotation omitted).

#### b. Floterials

A third method of representation used in a very few States, including New Hampshire within the last few decades, is a “floterial.” See G. Moncrief & R. Joula, *supra* at 742. A floterial has been described as a district that “floats above” several distinct districts. See *id.* at 738 \*151 (quotation omitted). Floterials, as constructed in New Hampshire, have led to unusual results and voting right inequities.

For example, in Carroll County, the 1992 house reapportionment plan included three floterials: Districts 3, 8 and 10. A map of the 1992 plan for Carroll County is attached to this opinion as Appendix A. Each floterial consisted of some locations that were part of the floterial only and other locations that were part of either a single-member or multi-member district, in addition to the floterial.

Carroll County District 10 was a floterial with two representatives covering four towns, Moultonborough, Sandwich, Tamworth and Tuftonboro, with a total population of 8,029, according to the 1990 census. Moultonborough was also a single-member district with one representative for the town's total population of 2,956. Thus, voters in Moultonborough voted for three representatives and voters in the other three towns voted for two representatives.

Also in the 1992 plan, Carroll County District 8 consisted of one floterial representative for Wakefield, Wolfboro and Brookfield. In addition, Wakefield was a single-member district with one representative for the town's population of

3,057 and Wolfboro was a single-member district with one representative for the town's population of 4,807. Because of the floterial, voters in both Wakefield and Wolfboro voted for two representatives, despite the difference in the population of these towns.

Finally, Carroll County District 3, a floterial, consisted of six communities: Bartlett (population 2,290), Chatham (population 268), Conway (population 7,940), Hale's Location (population 0), Hart's Location (population 36), and Jackson (population 678). Using 1990 census figures, the combined population of the six communities in District 3 was 11,212. The floterial representative covered all six communities in District 3. Additionally, four of the six communities in District 3 (Bartlett, Chatham, Hart's Location and Jackson with a combined total population of 3,272) were also in District 1, a single-member district; the other two communities in District 3 (Conway and Hale's Location with a combined total population of 7,940) were in District 2, a multi-member district with two representatives. The result of this configuration was that voters in Hart's \*480 Location, population 36, voted for the same number of representatives as the voters in Bartlett, population 2,290.

We select Carroll County as an example because it best illustrates that floterials are usually complicated and often confusing. By contrast, the court plan for Carroll County, attached as Appendix B, simply has one single-member district and four multi-member districts, each with four or fewer representatives. Moreover, as explained more fully in Sections III and IV below, when the towns within a floterial have vastly different \*152 populations, the use of the floterial can cause substantial deviations from the one person/one vote principle. See G. Moncrief & R. Joula, *supra* at 745. While the New Hampshire Constitution specifically contemplates the use of multi-member districts, see  N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 11, it is silent as to floterials.

#### B. Other State Constitutional Principles

In addition to requiring that representative districts be drawn “as equal as circumstances will admit,” the New Hampshire Constitution directs that any apportionment be based upon “the last general census of the inhabitants of the state taken by authority of the United States or of this state.”  *McGovern v. Secretary of State*, 138 N.H. 128, 131, 635 A.2d 498 (1993) (quotation omitted);  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9. The State Constitution also mandates that: (1) the house of

representatives be comprised of no fewer than 375 and no more than 400 members; (2) no town, ward or place be divided unless it requests to be divided by referendum; and (3) the boundaries of towns, wards and places be preserved.

☐ N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 9, ☐ 11, 11-a. As previously discussed, the New Hampshire Constitution also requires that the towns, wards and places in a district be “reasonably proximate to one another.” ☐ N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 11.

### C. Traditional Reapportionment Principles

[12] We also consider the State's traditional redistricting policy of maintaining county boundaries. See ☐ *Boyer v. Gardner*, 540 F.Supp. 624, 629–30 (D.N.H.1982). Preserving county boundaries has been important historically because “the state representatives of the districts of each county comprise the County Convention, which has the power to raise county taxes, make appropriations, and authorize the purchase or sale of county real estate.” ☐ *Id.* at 630 n. 10; RSA 24:1 (2000),:13 (2000),:13-a (2000).

[13] A second consideration is that representative districts have traditionally been comprised of contiguous territories. “A State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme.” ☐ *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 578, 84 S.Ct. 1362.

### III. Determining Whether a Plan Complies with One Person/One Vote

[14] [15] The established method to determine whether a reapportionment plan affords citizens an equal right to vote is to calculate the extent to which the plan deviates from the ideal district population. See ☐ *New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris*, 489 U.S. 688, 700, 700–01 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989). The first step is to determine the ideal population. To calculate the ideal population of a \*153 single-member district, the state population is divided by the total number of state representatives. In New Hampshire, assuming that the house contains 400 members, the ideal population for a single-member district \*\*481 is 3,089 (1,235,786 people divided by 400 representatives). The ideal population for a multi-member district is expressed as a multiple of the ideal population for a single-member district.

In New Hampshire, the ideal population for a district with three representatives is 3,089 multiplied by 3, or 9,267.

Once the ideal population is calculated, it is then possible to determine the extent to which a given district population deviates from the ideal. Relative deviation is the most commonly used measure and is derived by dividing the difference between the district's population and the ideal population by the ideal population.

For example, the relative deviation for a single-member district in New Hampshire with a population of 4,000 is calculated by subtracting 3,089 from 4,000 and dividing the difference (+911) by 3,089. The relative deviation is 29%. For a multi-member district, the relative deviation is calculated using the “aggregate method,” which aggregates the total number of representatives and the total population in the district to calculate deviation. Thus, for a district with a population of 8,000 and three representatives, the difference between 8,000 and 3 x 3,089 (9,267) is divided by 9,267, and the relative deviation is –14%.

Using the relative deviation, one can calculate the range of deviation by adding the largest positive deviation and the largest negative deviation without regard to algebraic sign. See ☐ *Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74, 98, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997). Thus, in the example above, 29% and –14% yields a range of deviation of 43%.

### IV. Plans Submitted by the Parties

We have carefully reviewed each plan against the neutral principles set forth above. All of the plans submitted for our consideration suffer from the same flaws. None is appropriate for wholesale adoption by the court. Moreover, none is appropriate for use as the court's starting point.

First, all of the plans contain erroneous population figures. All of the submitted plans were based upon ward boundaries drawn after the 2000 federal census was conducted. None of the plans identified which boundaries had changed, their location, or the data from which the changes were derived.

[16] Despite repeated requests, the parties did not forward this information to the court until July 1, 2002. After the court received the information, it discovered that there were discrepancies between the ward populations as reported by various cities and as reported in federal census data. This fact \*154 alone would require us to reject the parties' plans.

However, the court notified the parties of the discrepancies, and on July 16, 2002, the parties filed a joint stipulation to the accuracy of most of the federal census data. The only portion of the data the parties disputed concerned the federal census data for Manchester wards 5, 6 and 7 as reconfigured after the 2000 census. After reviewing the boundaries used by the city of Manchester for wards 5, 6 and 7, the court learned that the city did not use census block features as ward lines in two areas in these wards. Accordingly, the court used the census block features that were closest to the ward lines set by the city.

Although the parties stipulated to the federal census figures for all other cities with changed wards, the cities of Dover and Claremont filed separate partial objections to the figures for their cities. The court was able to verify the information submitted by Dover, but was not able to verify the information submitted by Claremont. Thus, the court used the information \*\*482 submitted by Dover in constructing its plan, but did not use the information submitted by Claremont.

More importantly, *all* of the plans miscalculate the extent to which they deviate from the one person/one vote principle. All of the plans rely upon floterials and use the aggregate method to calculate the deviation of the floterials. The aggregate method is appropriate for multi-member districts, but is not appropriate for the floterials in the parties' plans because it masks substantial deviation from the one person/one vote principle.

For example, in the plan submitted by the house, the towns of Epping (population 5,476) and Fremont (population 3,510) are combined in a floterial with one representative. Each town also constitutes a single-member district and thus each town has its own representative. The plan calculates the deviation as if all three representatives represents both towns together (-3.03%). In fact, each town is represented by one representative as well as a floterial representative. Thus, treating this floterial as if it were simply a three-member district is misleading.

Similarly, in the plans submitted by the speaker of the house, Brentwood, Epping and Fremont are single-member districts and all three are also part of a floterial. The plans calculate the deviation as if the representative for Epping, the representative for Fremont, the representative for Brentwood, and the floterial representative represent all four towns. They do not. In fact, each town is represented by its own representative and also the floterial representative. Again,

treating this floterial as if it were simply a four-member district distorts the actual deviation.

\*155 The parties rely upon  *Boyer*, 540 F.Supp. 624, as support for their use of the aggregate method. In *Boyer*, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire reviewed the constitutionality of the seventeen floterials included in the 1982 New Hampshire legislative apportionment plan under the Federal Constitution.  *Id.* at 625-26. In assessing the validity of the floterials, the court ruled that it was proper to apply the aggregate method of calculating the range of deviation. *Id.* at 627-28. *Boyer*, however, is not binding on this court when we are construing our own constitution. Moreover, we believe that, particularly as used by the parties in this case, the aggregate method obscures substantial deviations from the one person/one vote principle. *See* G. Moncrief & R. Joula, *supra* at 745.

No party has argued that, to the extent a plan relies upon floterials, the deviations for the floterials should be calculated using the component method. *See* Appendix C. Nor has any party relied upon  *Morris*, 489 U.S. at 700-02, 702 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. 1433, in which the court apparently relied upon a version of the component method to calculate total deviation in districts that had both single-member and at-large representatives. Here, unlike *Morris*, we have a record devoid of application of the component method to floterials.

Nonetheless, our own calculations indicate that even using the component method, the range of deviation produced by the floterials in the plans submitted is unacceptably high. For example, in the speaker's plans, the deviation created by the Rockingham District 25 floterial (Brentwood, Epping and Fremont) is -18.1% for Brentwood and +22.3% for Epping, yielding an overall deviation of 40.4%. In the house plan, the deviation created by the Rockingham District 24 floterial (Fremont and Epping) is -18.3% for Fremont and +10.1% for Epping, yielding a total deviation of 28.4%. In the petitioners' plan, the deviation created by the Rockingham District 9 floterial (Epping, Newfields, Newmarket \*\*483 and Nottingham) for Epping alone is 37.2%. Even without analysis of all of the floterials in each plan, these few examples demonstrate impermissible deviations, which are also far in excess of the deviation in the plan the court establishes today.

Another method for calculating the deviation for a floterial is the same as the method for calculating the deviation for a

single-member district; this method results in exceptionally high deviations. Under this method, the ideal population (3,089) is subtracted from the floterial population and the result is divided by the ideal population. For example, a floterial that has a population of 10,000—and there are many this size or larger in the plans submitted—would have a deviation of 223%.

Because each plan miscalculates the deviation for floterials, the plans necessarily miscalculate their range of deviation. The properly calculated ranges of deviation for all of the submitted plans significantly exceed “the \*156 range of constitutional tolerance.” *Opinion of the Justices*, 307 A.2d at 209. All of the submitted plans thus deviate substantially and impermissibly from the one person/one vote principle.

[17] Further, all of the submitted plans openly embrace political agendas. For instance, in the plan submitted by the speaker, he asserts, over the minority leader's objection, that one of the districts was created “despite a high deviation and a subsequently necessary floterial, at the request of the Minority Leader.” Similarly, in the supporting memorandum submitted by the house, the house notes that certain districts have been apportioned to preserve incumbent seats, the apportionment of one district in Merrimack County “was part of a bi-partisan agreement,” and the apportionment of a district in Sullivan County was also “a political agreement.” At oral argument, the parties accused each other of crafting apportionment plans to achieve partisan advantage. While political considerations are tolerated in legislatively-implemented redistricting plans, they have no place in a court-ordered plan. See *Wilson v. Eu*, 1 Cal.4th 707, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379, 823 P.2d 545, 576–77 (1992); see also *Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury*, 769 F.2d 265, 268 (5th Cir.1985) (*per curiam*).

The degree to which the submitted plans may reflect political considerations is perhaps best illustrated by how each plan treats the same cities and towns differently. For example, in the speaker's plans, the city of Berlin (population 10,331) constitutes a multi-member district with three representatives and is also part of a two-representative floterial that includes twenty-two other towns (from Bean's Grant to Whitefield).

By contrast, in the house plan, Berlin has no dedicated representatives. Rather, it is part of two multi-member districts, each with two representatives. The first multi-member district has thirteen other towns and the second has nineteen other towns. The towns in the first multi-member district are also part of the second multi-member district.

In the petitioners' plan, Berlin, Jefferson, Milan and Randolph are in one multi-member district that has four representatives. And, in the amici plan, Berlin, along with eight other towns, is part of a multi-member district that has four representatives.

[18] Based upon our review of the submitted plans, we conclude that none can be adopted by the court. Each plan relies upon incorrect population data. Each plan miscalculates the overall range of population deviation. Each plan has “calculated partisan political consequences (the details of which are unknown).... We have no \*\*484 principled way to choose [among] the plans, especially knowing that we would be endorsing an unknown but intended political consequence by the choice we make.” *Wilson*, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379, 823 P.2d at 576–77.

\*157 Accordingly, the court has devised a reapportionment plan consistent with neutral State and federal constitutional principles.

#### V. Court's Plan

[19] The court's plan, which is attached as Appendix D, retains the same number of representatives (400) as in the 1992 house plan. The court's plan creates eighty-eight representative districts, none of which is a floterial. Five are single-member districts, fourteen are two-member districts, twenty-four are three-member districts, fourteen are four-member districts and thirty-one are districts with more than four representatives. Thus, 65% of the districts have four or fewer representatives.

All of the districts are comprised of contiguous territories. No town, ward or place was divided unless it had requested division by referendum. See N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 11, 11–a. Nor were county boundaries crossed in creating the districts.

[20] The court's plan has a range of deviation of 9.26%, which is dramatically lower than the range of deviation in any of the submitted plans. The plan's deviation range was derived by adding the deviations of the highest relative positive deviation (Nashua ward 2 at +4.72%) and the highest negative relative deviation (Manchester ward 9 at 4.54%). These deviations were calculated by using the traditional method to calculate the deviations of single-member and multi-member districts. See *Morris*, 489 U.S. at 700, 700–01 n. 7, 109

S.Ct. 1433. Given the small population of this State, the unusually large size of its house of representatives, and our State Constitution and traditional redistricting policies, we hold that a deviation range of approximately 9% achieves “substantial equality.”  *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362.

New Hampshire has the largest state house of representatives in the country. See Council of State Governments, 33 *The Book of the States* at 70 (2000). New Hampshire also has one of the smallest state populations in the country. According to the 2000 federal census, New Hampshire ranks 41st in population. See U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001* at 21 (121st ed.2001). Because New Hampshire has such a large house of representatives (400 members) and such a small population (1,235,786), it takes very few people to affect deviation substantially. For instance, a 10% deviation represents only 309 people, and a 1% deviation represents a mere 31 people.

By contrast, Pennsylvania, with the next largest house of representatives (203) has a much larger population (12,281,054, according to the 2000 census). See Council of State Governments, *supra* at 70; U.S. Census Bureau, *State and County QuickFacts Pennsylvania*, \*158 available at <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42000.html>. The ideal district population in Pennsylvania is 60,498—about twenty times the size of the ideal district population in New Hampshire. A 10% deviation from the ideal district population in Pennsylvania represents 6,050 individuals—about twenty times the number of individuals represented by a 10% deviation from the ideal district population in New Hampshire (309 people).

Even Maine, with a population that is similar in size to New Hampshire's (1,274,923, according to the 2000 census), has a \*\*485 larger ideal district population than does New Hampshire. U.S. Census Bureau, *State and County QuickFacts Maine*, available at <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/23000.html>. The ideal district population in Maine is 8,443. This is because the size of the Maine House of Representatives is only 151 representatives, compared to New Hampshire's 400 representatives. See Council of State Governments, *supra* at 70. A 10% deviation in Maine represents more than 800 people—almost three times the number of individuals represented by the same deviation from the ideal district in New Hampshire (309 persons).

[21] The court did not use the 1992 house districting plan as its starting point because it was of dubious constitutionality at the time it was passed. The range of deviation for the 1992 plan, using the 1990 census figures, was at least 49.7%. Deviations in this range are too high to be justified by any state interest. See  *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 744, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973);  *Morris*, 489 U.S. at 702, 109 S.Ct. 1433.

[22] Moreover, the 1992 plan relied heavily upon floterials. Although it ostensibly contained seventy-two single-member districts, only nine of these districts were true single-member districts. The rest were created by floterials. For the reasons stated above, we reject floterials as an unsound redistricting device. The range of deviation calculated above did not include the floterials. Had they been included in the calculation using the component method, the range of deviation would likely have been higher.

The court attempted to create as many true single-member districts as possible, but the mathematical reality is that only a handful of towns have a population that is close to the ideal district population of 3,089.

Although the court's plan achieves a range of deviation that complies with the one person/one vote principle, the court considered taking steps to reduce the deviation range even further. The court discovered, however, that reducing the range of deviation further required dividing wards into single-member districts. Dividing wards would violate Part II, Article 11—a of the New Hampshire Constitution. Indeed, if the court divided one ward, it would have no principled basis for keeping the boundaries of any other \*159 ward intact. In other words, if the court were to ignore the boundaries of one town, ward or place to create a single-member district, it would have no valid reason not to create single-member districts statewide.

Although creating 400 single-member districts statewide would have resulted in little or no deviation, such a radical restructuring of the house was not only not required by the one person/one vote principle, but would have contravened other State constitutional imperatives.

The court endeavored to create multi-member districts that had as few representatives as possible because of its concern that large multi-member districts may tend to dilute the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting

population. See *Opinion of the Justices*, 111 N.H. at 151, 276 A.2d 825. Although we are not called upon, today, to determine the effect of RSA 656:5 (Supp.2001), requiring majority party candidates for the house to be listed first on all ballots, the number and size of multi-member districts in this plan may justify the concern about the statute raised at oral argument by the amici.

Large multi-member districts exist in the court's plan for three reasons: (1) the city or town did not request division, see N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 11-a; (2) a city **\*\*486** divided into wards had not properly drawn its ward boundaries; or (3) joining contiguous towns and/or joining contiguous wards was required to produce deviations within the 5% range.

[23] For instance, the court discovered that in the city of Rochester, city officials used features unrecognized by the United States Census Bureau as ward boundaries and used its own enumeration, instead of federal census data, to determine ward populations. "An actual census taken by an individual city ... [is] not ... a general census taken by the authority of the United States or of this State," as required by Part II, Article 9 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and may "not be used as a basis for apportionment." *Opinion of the Justices*, 111 N.H. at 150, 276 A.2d 825 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the court was required to consider the city of Rochester as a whole and did not use the city's ward boundaries. It is now the largest multi-member district.

Similarly, the court was forced to consider the city of Claremont as a whole, rather than to use its ward boundaries, because the court was not able to verify the populations totals provided by the city for its adjusted wards.

One of the largest multi-member districts, Salem/Windham, has 13 representatives, the same number which the two communities had between them under the 1992 plan.

In Manchester, wards 2, 3, 10 and 11 are combined into an eleven representative multi-member district because it was the only combination **\*160** of wards that considered in light of all other towns, wards and places, would produce a deviation of less than 5%.

In devising the reapportionment plan, the court did not consider the impact upon either political parties or incumbency.

*VI. Conclusion*

The court recognizes that its redistricting plan changes house districts significantly. These changes were unavoidable because past house districting plans have not given the fundamental democratic principle of one person/one vote the attention and weight to which it is entitled. The court's plan reinstates the primacy of this principle and ensures that "the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State." *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362.

This plan is effective immediately and the injunction against the house filing period is dissolved as of 12:01 a.m. July 31, 2002. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the filing of any motion to reconsider shall not stay the effective date of the plan.

*So ordered.*

BROCK, C.J., and NADEAU, DALIANIS and DUGGAN, JJ., concurred.

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Carroll County N.H. House Districts 1992.....	Appendix A.
Carroll County House Districts Court Plan 2002.....	Appendix B
Component Method.....	Appendix C
N.H. House Districts Court Plan 2002.....	Appendix D

Manchester Area Map Court Plan 2002..... Appendix E

Nashua Area Map Court Plan 2002..... Appendix F

Concord Area Map Court Plan 2002..... Appendix G

Dover Area Map Court Plan 2002..... Appendix H


Population Summary Report Court Plan 2002..... Appendix I

Full Geography Report Court Plan 2002..... Appendix J

**\*\*487 \*161 APPENDIX A**

APPENDIX A


Carroll County  
New Hampshire House Districts 1992



**\*\*488 \*162 APPENDIX B**

APPENDIX B

Carroll County House Districts  
New Hampshire Supreme Court Plan 2 002



**\*\*489 \*163 APPENDIX C**

APPENDIX C

Component Method

To Calculate Ratio Share

Divide the town population by the total population – this assigns each town their share of the floterial plus their dedicated seats – divide by total seats and convert to percentage

3,286 ÷ 27,640 = .1188 = 11.9%

To Calculate Deviation

Ratio Share + Other Seats in Town = Adjusted Number of Seats

1 + .119 = 1.119

Town Population × Adjusted Seats = Component Population

3286 × 1.119 = 2936.55


(Component Population – Ideal Population) ÷ Ideal Population =

2936.55 – 2773 = 163.55 ÷ 2773 = .0589 = 5.89%

See N.H. Redistricting Committee, Methods for Calculating Deviation, available at <http://gencourt.state.nh.us/houseredistrict/deviationcalculation.html>.


**\*\*490 \*164 APPENDIX D**

APPENDIX D




**\*\*491 \*165 APPENDIX E**

APPENDIX E



**\*\*492 \*166 APPENDIX F**

APPENDIX F



**\*\*493 \*167 APPENDIX G**



APPENDIX J

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation				
001	2	Coe County	Alkinson & Gilmanston Academy Grant	12					
			Cambridge	16					
			Clarksville	294					
			Colerbrook	2321					
			Columbia	750					
			Dix Grant	0					
			Dixville	75					
			Dummer	305					
			Erol	208					
			Erving's Location	1					
			Millsfield	22					
			Odel	5					
			Pittsburg	867					
			Second College Grant	0					
			Stewartstown	1012					
			Wentworth Location	44					
			<b>Totals</b>				<b>6026</b>	<b>-2.56%</b>	
			002	5		Coe County	Beans Grant	0	
							Carroll	663	
							Chandlers Purchase	0	
Crawfords Purchase	0								
Cutts Grant	0								
Dalton	927								
Corham	2895								
Greens Grant	0								
Hadleys Purchase	0								
Jefferson	1006								
Kilkenny	0								
Linsdaler	3280								
Low and Burbanks Grant	0								
Martins Location	0								
Northumberland	2436								
Pinkhams Grant	0								
Randolph	339								
Sargent's Purchase	0								
Stark	516								
Staford	942								
Thompson and Meserves Purchase	0								
Whitefield	2036								
<b>Totals</b>				<b>13454</b>	<b>-2.56%</b>				
003	4	Coe County	Beans Purchase	4					
			Berlin city	10331					
			Milan	1331					
			Shelburne	379					
			Success	2					
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12647</b>	<b>-2.56%</b>				
004	4	Carroll County	Bartlett	2705					
		Carroll County	Chatham	260					
		Carroll County	Conway	8604					
		Carroll County	Hale's Location	58					

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
		Carroll County	Hart's Location	37	
		Carroll County	Jackson	835	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12499</b>	<b>1.16%</b>
005	1	Carroll County	Albany	654	
		Carroll County	Easton	375	
		Carroll County	Madison	1984	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>3013</b>	<b>-2.45%</b>
006	3	Carroll County	Freedom	1303	
		Carroll County	Cassipee	4211	
		Carroll County	Sandwich	1286	
		Carroll County	Temworth	2510	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9310</b>	<b>0.46%</b>
007	4	Carroll County	Moultonborough	4484	
		Carroll County	Tuftonboro	2148	
		Carroll County	Wolfeboro	6083	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12715</b>	<b>2.91%</b>
008	2	Carroll County	Brookfield	604	
		Carroll County	Effingham	1273	
		Carroll County	Wakefield	4252	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6129</b>	<b>-0.79%</b>
009	2	Grafton County	Littleton	5545	
		Grafton County	Lyman	467	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6332</b>	<b>2.48%</b>
010	1	Grafton County	Bethlehem	2199	
		Grafton County	Francestown	924	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>3123</b>	<b>1.10%</b>
011	2	Grafton County	Bath	953	
		Grafton County	Easton	256	
		Grafton County	Landaff	378	
		Grafton County	Lincoln	1271	
		Grafton County	Lincoln	1567	
		Grafton County	Livermore	3	
		Grafton County	Monroe	759	
		Grafton County	Sugar Hill	563	
Grafton County	Waterville Valley	257			
<b>Totals</b>				<b>5967</b>	<b>-3.42%</b>
012	1	Grafton County	Thampton	1843	
		Grafton County	Woodstock	1139	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>2962</b>	<b>-3.46%</b>

\*\*499

\*\*498

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
013	2	Grafton County	Benton	314	2.27%
			Grafton County	4416	
			Grafton County	709	
			Grafton County	873	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6312</b>	
014	2	Grafton County	Campton	2719	-0.05%
			Grafton County	87	
			Grafton County	1091	
			Grafton County	1480	
			Grafton County	798	
			Grafton County	798	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6175</b>	
015	2	Grafton County	Hebron	459	2.86%
			Grafton County	5892	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6391</b>	
016	3	Grafton County	Alexandria	1329	4.42%
			Grafton County	1955	
			Grafton County	974	
			Grafton County	3033	
			Grafton County	456	
			Grafton County	1930	
			Grafton County	1930	
			Grafton County	1930	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9677</b>	
017	7	Grafton County	Canaan	3319	2.93%
			Grafton County	353	
			Grafton County	4618	
			Grafton County	1138	
			Grafton County	10850	
			Grafton County	1679	
			Grafton County	299	
			Grafton County	299	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>22256</b>	
018	4	Grafton County	Lebanon city	12568	1.72%
			Grafton County	12568	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12568</b>	
019	2	Sullivan County	Cornish	1661	-1.76%
			Grafton County	2167	
			Sullivan County	2241	
			Sullivan County	2241	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6069</b>	
020	3	Sullivan County	Croydon	661	0.36%
			Goshen	741	
			Sullivan County	6269	
			Sullivan County	945	
			Sullivan County	945	
			Sullivan County	895	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12403</b>	

**\*\*500**

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
021	1	Sullivan County	Sunapee	3055	-1.10%
			Sullivan County	3055	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>3055</b>	
022	5	Sullivan County	Claremont city	13151	1.34%
			Sullivan County	971	
			Sullivan County	1530	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>15652</b>	
023	2	Sullivan County	Acworth	836	-0.11%
			Sullivan County	4749	
			Sullivan County	586	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6171</b>	
024	4	Cheshire County	Alstead	1944	-2.66%
			Cheshire County	777	
			Cheshire County	747	
			Cheshire County	634	
			Cheshire County	237	
			Cheshire County	828	
			Cheshire County	746	
			Cheshire County	673	
			Cheshire County	3654	
			Cheshire County	1747	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12027</b>	
025	7	Cheshire County	Keene city	22563	4.95%
			Cheshire County	22563	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>22563</b>	
026	5	Cheshire County	Chesterfield	3542	-2.97%
			Cheshire County	2141	
			Cheshire County	4082	
			Cheshire County	1077	
			Cheshire County	4144	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>4144</b>	
027	4	Cheshire County	Harrisville	1075	-4.13%
			Cheshire County	2009	
			Cheshire County	6900	
			Cheshire County	1962	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>11946</b>	
028	4	Cheshire County	Dubin	1478	0.36%
			Cheshire County	5476	
			Cheshire County	5451	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12403</b>	

**\*\*501**

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
029	3	Belknap County	Center Harbor	996	-2.84%
			New Hampton	1950	
			Sanbornton	2581	
			Tilton	3477	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>9004</b>	
030	7	Belknap County	Laconia city	16411	3.36%
			Meredith	5943	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>22354</b>	
031	6	Belknap County	Alton	4502	1.63%
			Barnstead	3886	
			Belmont	6716	
			Gilford	6803	
			Gilanton	3090	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>24967</b>	
032	2	Merrimack County	Danbury	1071	2.46%
			New London	4116	
			Wilmot	1144	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>6331</b>	
033	3	Merrimack County	Franklin city	8405	1.40%
			Hill	992	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>9397</b>				
034	6	Merrimack County	Bradford	1454	1.62%
			Hendon	4433	
			Hopkinton	5389	
			Newbury	1702	
			Sutton	1544	
			Warner	2760	
			Webster	1579	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>19871</b>	
035	6	Merrimack County	Andover	2109	-3.28%
			Boscawen	3672	
			Canterbury	1979	
			Loudon	4461	
			Northfield	4548	
			Salisbury	1137	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>17926</b>				
036	3	Merrimack County	Chichester	2235	-1.45%
			Fremboke	6897	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>9133</b>				
037	6	Merrimack County	Allenstown	4843	

\*\*502

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
Totals			Merrimack County	4021	-0.79%
			Merrimack County	11721	
			Merrimack County	3931	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>24516</b>	
038	4	Merrimack County	Concord Ward 01	4191	1.63%
			Concord Ward 02	4175	
			Concord Ward 03	4228	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>12594</b>				
039	5	Merrimack County	Concord Ward 04	3907	3.99%
			Concord Ward 08	4029	
			Concord Ward 09	3967	
			Concord Ward 10	4169	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>16662</b>	
040	4	Merrimack County	Concord Ward 05	4210	-2.63%
			Concord Ward 06	3671	
			Concord Ward 07	3650	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>12031</b>				
041	3	Merrimack County	Bow	7138	1.05%
			Dunbarton	2226	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>9364</b>				
042	3	Hillsborough County	Antrim	2449	0.54%
			Hendon	1739	
			Hillsborough	4928	
			Windsor	201	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>9317</b>				
043	2	Hillsborough County	Bernington	1401	3.89%
			Dearing	1875	
			Francesstown	1480	
			Greenfield	1657	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>6413</b>	
044	4	Hillsborough County	Greenville	2224	3.24%
			New Ipswich	4289	
			Peterborough	5863	
			Sharon	360	
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>12756</b>	
045	4	Hillsborough County	Lyndeborough	1585	3.24%
			Mont Vernon	2034	
			New Boston	4138	
			Temple	1267	
			Wilton	3743	

\*\*503

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12797</b>	<b>3.57%</b>
046	4	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Brookline Hollis Mason	4191 7915 1167	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12343</b>	<b>-0.11%</b>
047	8	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Amherst Milford	10769 13535	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>24304</b>	<b>-1.65%</b>
048	8	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Coffstown Weare	16929 7776	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>24705</b>	<b>-0.63%</b>
049	6	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Manchester Ward 01 Manchester Ward 12	5033 6679	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>17712</b>	<b>-4.44%</b>
050	11	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Manchester Ward 02 Manchester Ward 03 Manchester Ward 10 Manchester Ward 11	5073 5013 8715 8708	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>35509</b>	<b>4.50%</b>
051	3	Hillsborough County	Manchester Ward 04	8900	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>8900</b>	<b>-3.96%</b>
052	3	Hillsborough County	Manchester Ward 05	9070	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9070</b>	<b>-2.13%</b>
053	3	Hillsborough County	Manchester Ward 07	9070	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9070</b>	<b>-2.13%</b>
054	3	Hillsborough County	Manchester Ward 06	8978	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>8978</b>	<b>-3.12%</b>
055	3	Hillsborough County	Manchester Ward 09	8846	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>8846</b>	<b>-4.64%</b>
056	3	Hillsborough County	Manchester Ward 08	8921	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>8921</b>	<b>-3.73%</b>
057	8	Hillsborough County	Bedford	18274	

**\*\*504**

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
<b>Totals</b>				<b>18274</b>	<b>-1.48%</b>
058	11	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Litchfield Merrimack	7360 25119	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>32479</b>	<b>-4.41%</b>
059	3	Hillsborough County	Nashua Ward 02	9704	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9704</b>	<b>4.72%</b>
060	3	Hillsborough County	Nashua Ward 03	9698	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9698</b>	<b>4.65%</b>
061	3	Hillsborough County	Nashua Ward 01	9551	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9551</b>	<b>3.96%</b>
062	6	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Nashua Ward 04 Nashua Ward 06	9943 9252	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>19195</b>	<b>3.57%</b>
063	3	Hillsborough County	Nashua Ward 05	9625	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9625</b>	<b>3.66%</b>
064	3	Hillsborough County	Nashua Ward 09	9078	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9078</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
065	8	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Nashua Ward 07 Nashua Ward 08	7438 11816	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>19254</b>	<b>3.89%</b>
066	11	Hillsborough County Hillsborough County	Hudson Pelham	22928 10914	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>33842</b>	<b>-0.40%</b>
067	14	Strafford County Strafford County Strafford County	Rochester city Rollinsford Somersworth city	28451 2648 11477	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>42586</b>	<b>-1.53%</b>
068	8	Strafford County Strafford County Strafford County Strafford County Strafford County Strafford County	Barrington Farmington Middleton Milton New Durham Strafford	7475 5774 1440 3910 2220 3526	

**\*\*505**

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
<b>Totals</b>				<b>24445</b>	<b>-1.08%</b>
069	3	Strafford County Strafford County	Dover Ward 05 Dover Ward 06	4482 4504	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>8986</b>	<b>-2.92%</b>
070	3	Strafford County Strafford County	Dover Ward 01 Dover Ward 02	4542 4456	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>8998</b>	<b>-2.90%</b>
071	3	Strafford County Strafford County	Dover Ward 03 Dover Ward 04	4411 4479	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>8890</b>	<b>-4.07%</b>
072	6	Strafford County Strafford County Strafford County	Durham Lee Madbury	12664 4145 1509	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>18318</b>	<b>-1.17%</b>
073	5	Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County	Candia Deerfield Northwood Nottingham	3911 3678 3640 3701	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>14930</b>	<b>-3.33%</b>
074	3	Rockingham County	Raymond	5674	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9674</b>	<b>4.39%</b>
075	9	Rockingham County Rockingham County	Auburn Londonberry	4682 23236	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>27918</b>	<b>0.42%</b>
076	13	Rockingham County Rockingham County	Salem Windham	28112 10709	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>38821</b>	<b>-3.33%</b>
077	11	Rockingham County	Derry	34021	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>34021</b>	<b>0.12%</b>
078	2	Rockingham County	Atkinson	6179	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6178</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
079	11	Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County	Chester Dumfries Hampstead Kingston	3792 4023 8297 5802	

State of New Hampshire  
House Districts  
Supreme Court Plan 2002  
Full Geography Report

DISTRICT	SEATS	COUNTY	TOWNSHIP/WARD	TAPERSONS	Deviation
		Rockingham County	Plaistow	7747	
		Rockingham County	Sandown	5143	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>34864</b>	<b>2.60%</b>
080	4	Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County	Brentwood Epping Fremont	3197 5476 3510	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12183</b>	<b>-1.40%</b>
081	2	Rockingham County Rockingham County	East Kingston Newton	1764 4289	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6073</b>	<b>-1.70%</b>
082	3	Rockingham County Rockingham County	Newfields Newmarket	1551 8027	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>9578</b>	<b>3.38%</b>
083	8	Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County	Exeter North Hampton Stratham	14058 4259 6355	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>24672</b>	<b>-0.16%</b>
084	4	Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County	Hampton Falls Kensington Seabrook South Hampton	1880 1893 7834 844	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>12951</b>	<b>1.58%</b>
085	5	Rockingham County	Hampton	14937	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>14937</b>	<b>-3.29%</b>
086	7	Rockingham County Rockingham County	Newington Parsmouth city	775 20784	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>21559</b>	<b>-0.30%</b>
087	1	Rockingham County	Greenland	3208	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>3208</b>	<b>3.85%</b>
088	2	Rockingham County Rockingham County Rockingham County	County subdivisions not defined New Castle Rye	0 1010 5182	
<b>Totals</b>				<b>6192</b>	<b>0.23%</b>

All Citations

148 N.H. 143, 804 A.2d 471

\*\*506

End of Document

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.